The first part of this book addresses the decision problem of an investor in a single-period framework. We suppose the investor makes certain decisions at the beginning of the period (how much of her wealth to spend and how to invest what she does not spend), and the generally random investment returns and any other income (such as labor income) determine her wealth at the end of the period. The investor has preferences for spending at the beginning of the period and wealth at the end of the period, and these preferences, in conjunction with the available investment opportunities, determine her choices.
Preferences are for real wealth, meaning wealth adjusted for inflation. We can also say that preferences are for consumption, measured in terms of some standard basket of goods. The allocation of resources across goods is a topic in microeconomics, not finance. Following the common practice in finance, we will abstract from that issue and assume there is only a single consumption good. We will typically use it as the numeraire (meaning the unit in which prices are measured, so the price of the consumption good is always 1). However, on occasion, it will be convenient to treat consumption and wealth as if they were denominated in dollars. You are free to substitute any other currency or to translate "dollar" as "unit of the consumption good." (p.4) Models with more than one time period are studied later in the book. Introducing multiple periods typically introduces state dependence in the investor's preferences for end-of-period wealth. Specifically, the investor cares about the investment opportunities available at the end of the period as well as her wealth, because it is the combination of wealth and investment opportunities that determines the possibilities for future wealth (and consumption). The correlation of wealth with changes in investment opportunities is usually an important consideration in multiperiod settings; however, in PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: HINARI; date: 29 November 2018 the single-period model it is assumed that preferences depend only on the (marginal) probability distribution of wealth.
It is assumed in most of the book that each investor satisfies certain axioms of rationality, which imply that the investor's choices are those that maximize the expected value of a utility function. Specifically, letting denote beginning-of-period consumption and denote end-of-period consumption (which equals end-of-period wealth), assume there is a function such that the investor maximizes the expected value of . 1 In many parts of the book-in particular, in this chapter and the next-the probabilities with respect to which expected values are computed can be subjective probabilities; that is, we do not need to assume the investor knows the true probabilities of the outcomes implied by her choices.
In this chapter and in many other places in the book, we simplify our model and focus on end-of-period wealth. We can do this by assuming is optimally chosen and by considering the derived utility function where denotes the optimal beginning-of-period consumption. Denoting this function of by and denoting expectation by , assume the investor chooses her investments to maximize the expected utility .
Utility Functions and Risk Aversion
A utility function is said to represent preferences over wealth that an investor with concave utility would prefer the mean of the gamble. Figure 1 .2 sketches the proof of Jensen's inequality, using the fact that a tangent line to the graph of a concave function lies above the graph of the function.
Coefficients of Risk Aversion
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion at a wealth level is defined as where the primes denote derivatives. The second derivative of the utility function measures its concavity; dividing by the first derivative eliminates (p.6) the dependence on the arbitrary scaling of the utility-that is, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is unaffected by a monotone affine transform of the utility function. Hence, it depends on the preferences, not on the particular utility function chosen to represent the Thus, the proportion of initial wealth that an investor would pay to avoid a gamble equal to the proportion of initial wealth depends on her relative risk aversion and the variance of .
The result (1.5) follows immediately from (1.4): Let be the gamble we considered when discussing absolute risk aversion; then, the variance of the gamble is ; thus,
To make (1.4) more concrete, consider flipping a coin for $1.
In other words, take with equal probabilities. The standard deviation of this gamble is 1, so the variance is 1 also. Condition (1.4) says that an investor would pay approximately to avoid the gamble. If she would pay 10 cents to avoid it, then .
To make (1.5) more concrete, let be your wealth and consider flipping a coin where you win 10% of if the coin comes up heads and lose 10% of if it comes up tails. This is a large gamble, so the approximation in (1.5) may not be very good. Nevertheless, it can help us interpret (1.5). The standard deviation of the random variable defined as with equal probabilities is 0.1, and its variance is .
According to (1.5), an investor would pay approximately of her wealth to avoid the gamble. If she would pay exactly 2% of her wealth to avoid this 10% gamble, then (1.5) says that .
Second-Order Risk Aversion (p.10) We interpreted (1.4) as stating that the risk premium is proportional to absolute risk aversion. Obviously, we can also say that the risk premium is proportional to the variance of the gamble. This is called second-order risk aversion. Second-order risk aversion is a consequence of expected utility maximization. There are different theories of preferences, some of which are discussed in Chapter 25, that imply first-order risk aversion, meaning that the risk premium is proportional to the standard deviation of the gamble. Firstorder risk aversion entails much larger risk premia for small gambles, because the standard deviation divided by the We will show that expected utility maximization implies that , so the risk premium is approximately proportional to the variance. Furthermore, we will show that, in the constant of proportionality, is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion at .
Differentiate both sides of (1.6) with respect to to obtain (1.8) Evaluating this at yields since the mean of is zero by assumption. Thus, as claimed before. To derive (1.4) from (1.7), it now suffices to show that is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion at .
To deduce this, differentiate (1.8) again. This yields (1.9) (p.11) Evaluate (1.9) at , use the fact that , and use the fact that has zero mean and unit variance to obtain Thus, . A large amount of financial research is based on a special class of utility functions. This is the class of utility functions having linear risk tolerance (LRT), meaning that the risk tolerance at wealth is (1.10) for some constants and . 6 The parameter is called the cautiousness parameter. We also say that these utility functions have hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), due to the fact that the graph of the function is a hyperbola. Note that any LRT utility function with a positive cautiousness parameter has increasing risk tolerance and therefore decreasing absolute risk aversion. In the case at hand, , which has mean zero and variance
Linear Risk Tolerance
. Thus, and (1.11) implies (1.13) This shows that the approximate formula (1.4) is exact when absolute risk aversion is constant and the gamble is normally distributed.
(p.13) Consider flipping a fair coin for $1,000. Formula (1.11) says that the amount an individual with CARA utility would pay to avoid the gamble is the same whether she starts with wealth of $1,000 or wealth of $1,000,000,000. One might think that in the latter case the gamble would seem much more trivial, and, since it is a fair gamble, the individual would pay very little to avoid it. On the other hand, she might pay a significant amount to avoid gambling all of her wealth. If sothat is, if an individual would pay less with an initial wealth of $1,000,000,000 than with an initial wealth of $1,000 to avoid a given gamble-then she has DARA utility. where is a positive constant different from 1. We can easily check that is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the utility function (1.14). Logarithmic utility has constant relative risk aversion equal to 1, and an investor with power utility (1.14) is said to be more risk averse than a log-utility investor if and to be less risk averse than a log-utility investor if . The three cases , , and are illustrated in Figure 1 .4. Obviously, the shifted log utility function includes logarithmic utility as a special case ( ). Also, the shifted power utility function includes power utility as a special case (when , the additional factor in the definition of shifted power utility is irrelevant). For the shifted utility functions with , we can interpret the constant as a subsistence level of consumption and interpret the utility as the utility of consumption in excess of the subsistence level. This interpretation probably makes more sense when , but we do not require to use the utility functions. For the shifted power utility function with , is a satiation (bliss) level of wealth: For either the utility function is not defined (in the real numbers) or it is decreasing in wealth, as in the quadratic case discussed below.
There are three different cases for the shifted power utility function, the first two of which parallel the cases for power utility.
(i) . The utility is proportional to , where
. It is defined for and is monotone increasing up to zero as . If the parameter is larger than any wealth level the investor could achieve, then it is not a problem that the quadratic utility is decreasing for wealth above . A greater problem with quadratic utility is that it has increasing absolute risk aversion, even for . This property of increasing absolute risk aversion (decreasing risk tolerance) is shared by every shifted power utility function with . As will be seen in Chapter 2, this implies that risky assets are inferior goods for an investor with quadratic utility: such an investor would invest less in risky assets if her wealth were higher. This is a very unattractive assumption.
Utility and Wealth Moments
We can often represent the expected utility of a gamble as an infinite series in the central moments of the gamble's distribution. Let denote the mean of a gamble , and suppose the utility function has a convergent Taylor series expansion around . This means that It is tempting to truncate the infinite sum in (1.16) and to argue that we can approximate expected utility by a function of a finite number of central moments. However, this is dangerous to do. For most utility functions, and absent any restrictions on the distributions of gambles being considered, any function of a finite number (say ) of central moments will fail to represent preferences, in the sense that there exist two gambles with all of the first moments indicating one preference, whereas the actual expected utilities imply the opposite preference. See Section 1.6 and Exercise 1.4 for further information on this point. Of course, expected quadratic utility depends only on the first two central moments, as discussed in the previous section, and, if only normal distributions are being considered, then expected utility again depends on only the first two central moments (see the end-of-chapter notes for further discussion of this point). is possible for to be less risky than and to be preferred by a risk-averse investor to .
To rule out the possibility that hedges , we want to assume is unrelated to . There are three different ways of formalizing the concept of "unrelated."
(1) Two random variables and are said to be independent if for all and .
(2) is said to be mean independent of if (3) and are uncorrelated if .
(p.18) In (2), the random variable is called the conditional expectation of given . It is defined in Appendix A.
Usually, it depends on the realization of (is a function of ) and hence is a random variable. It is the probability-weighted average value of , with the probabilities being conditional on knowledge of . Observing will generally lead to updating of and Milnor (1953) , which is a fairly definitive formulation and extension of the von Neumann-Morgenstern result, this axiom takes the form: If gamble A is preferred to gamble B, and C is any other gamble, then the compound lottery consisting of a one-half chance of A and a one-half chance of C should be preferred the compound lottery consisting of a one-half chance of B and a one-half chance of C. This axiom is consistently violated in some experimental settings, as is discussed in Chapter 25.
Savage (1954) extends the von Neumann-Morgenstern result to the setting of subjective probabilities. Naturally, this also requires a version of the independence axiom (Savage's sure thing principle).
Arrow (1971) argues that the utility function should be bounded on the set of possible outcomes (boundedness follows from his monotone continuity axiom). Note that all of the LRT utility functions (on their maximal domains) are either unbounded above or unbounded below or both. Based in part on the (p.20) argument that a utility function should be bounded, Arrow (1965) suggests that utility functions should have increasing relative risk aversion. Brocas, Carrillo, Giga, and Zapatero (2015) provide experimental evidence that most people have increasing relative risk aversion. There is a particular subclass of the LRT class that are DARA utility functions with increasing relative risk aversion (Exercise 1.10).
An unbounded utility function is somewhat problematic conceptually. For example, if the utility function is unbounded above, then there exists a gamble (a generalized St. Petersburg paradox-see Exercise 1.9) with infinite expected utility, meaning that it would be preferred to any constant wealth, no matter how large. A common response in support of unbounded utility functions is that an expected utility of can be achieved only via an unbounded gamble (if is concave, then implies ) and such gambles are surely not in anyone's choice set.
Bounded utility functions (defined on unbounded domains) are also somewhat paradoxical. If the utility function is bounded above, then there exist and such that, for all , the person prefers to a gamble in which she obtains and with equal probabilities. Thus, the possibility of losing is so unattractive that no amount of possible gain can compensate for it. This is explored in the context of constant relative risk aversion in Exercise 1.2(b).
The concepts of absolute and relative risk aversion are due to Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964 Pratt ( , 1976 and are often called the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion. Arrow (1965) relates the risk-aversion coefficients to portfolio choice, as is discussed in the next chapter. Pratt (1964) shows that (up to monotone affine transforms) the only CARA utility function is the negative exponential function and the only CRRA utility functions are the log and power functions. Mossin (1968) appears to be the first to characterize the LRT utility functions.
Pratt (1964) derives the result in Section 1.2 that the risk premium for a small gamble is approximately proportional to the variance of the gamble. This result means that expected utility maximizers are approximately risk neutral with respect to small gambles. Aversion to small and large gambles in the context of CRRA utility is considered in Exercise 1. Stambaugh (1991). Roughly speaking, a "reasonable" aversion to small bets seems to imply an "unreasonable" aversion to large bets, when relative risk aversion is constant. Rabin (2000) derives a result of this form that applies to any expected utility preferences.
Pratt (1964) also shows that nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is equivalent to requiring smaller risk premia at higher wealth levels, in the sense that whenever is the premium for a zero-mean gamble at initial wealth and is (p.21) the premium for the same gamble at initial wealth for . 8 Dybvig and Lippman (1983) show that this is equivalent to the following: If an individual will accept a gamble (having necessarily a positive expected value if the individual is risk averse) at any wealth level, then she will also accept the gamble at any higher wealth level.
These implications for risk premia or choices at different wealth levels also apply to the risk premia or choices of different individuals: Assuming the absolute risk aversion of person 1 at each wealth level is at least as large as that of person 2 and both start at the same initial wealth, then the risk premium required by person 1 for any zero mean gamble is at least as large as that required by person 2, and if person 1 will accept a particular gamble, then person 2 will also. Pratt (1964) shows that person 1 being more risk averse in the sense of having a (weakly) higher absolute risk aversion at each wealth level is equivalent to the utility function of person 1 being a concave transformation of that of person 2: for a concave function . In this sense, "more risk averse" is equivalent to the utility function being "more concave."
Ross (1981) defines a stronger concept of nonincreasing risk aversion, involving the premia for gambles when uncertainty is unavoidable. Let and be any gambles such that has a zero mean and is mean independent of ( ). Let be a constant. Let and be the risk premia for when initial wealth is the random amounts and respectively, meaning (a) Suppose she faces a gamble in which she wins or loses some amount with equal probabilities. Derive a formula for the amount that she would pay to avoid the gamble; that is, find satisfying when is log or power utility. Do not use the approximation (1.5).
(b) Suppose instead that she is offered a gamble in which she loses or wins with equal probabilities.
Find the maximum possible loss at which she would accept the gamble; that is, find satisfying when is log or power utility. Do not use the approximation (1.5).
(c) Suppose the person has wealth of $100,000 and faces a gamble as in Part (a). Use the answer in Part (a) to calculate the amount she would pay to avoid the You should see that has a higher mean, lower variance, and higher skewness than . Show that, nevertheless, is preferred to by a CARA investor with absolute risk aversion equal to 1, by a CRRA investor with relative risk aversion equal to 1/2, and by an investor with shifted log utility . (a) Verify that the fraction of wealth she will pay to avoid a gamble that is proportional to wealth is independent of initial wealth (that is, show (p.25) that defined in (1.15) is independent of for logarithmic and power utility).
(b) Consider a gamble . Assume is lognormally distributed; specifically, assume , where is normally distributed with variance and mean .
By the rule for means of exponentials of normals, .
Show that defined in (1.15) equals
Note: This is consistent with the approximation (1.5), because a first-order Taylor series expansion of the exponential function around shows that when is small.
Use the law of iterated expectations to show that if
, then (thus, mean independence implies uncorrelated).
Let
, where is normally distributed with mean and variance . Show that (c) What is the -field generated by ?
1.9.
Suppose an investor has log utility for each . (1.) Throughout Part I of this book, a tilde is used to denote a random variable.
(2.) A function is concave if for any and and any ,
. The function is strictly concave if the inequality is strict for any .
(3.) The harmonic mean of numbers is the reciprocal of the average reciprocal:
(4.) This use of the word "premium" is from insurance. The term "risk premium" is used in a different way in most of the book, meaning the extra expected return an investor earns from holding a risky asset.
(5.) We simply assume that is sufficiently differentiable to justify this expansion. We also assume that we can interchange differentiation and expectation in the following argument. Both assumptions can be avoided at the expense of a slightly lengthier argument.
(6.) Generally, in this book, a distinction is made between linear and affine functions, a linear function being of the form and an affine function including a constant (intercept):
. However, we make an exception in the term "linear risk tolerance," which is firmly entrenched in the literature.
(7.) It is useful to compare (1.12) to Jensen's inequality.
Jensen's inequality states that if is a concave function and is a random variable (not necessarily normal) with mean , then . On the other hand, if is convex (meaning that is concave), then we have the opposite inequality: . The exponential function is convex, so Jensen's inequality tells us that
